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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the interminable arguments in the Anglo-American legal
tradition centers on whether judges find law or make it. At one end of the
spectrum, the judge is seen as a demi-god creating law ex nihilo; at the other,
as an inert, anonymous being-the judicial equivalent of a potted plant.1
Sometimes the images show up together in the same account, as when it is
suggested that judges act like potted plants when there are rules to be applied
but "legislate" freely when they fill in the gaps.2
Even if the polar accounts seemed plausible on the surface, neither
squares very well with the ways in which human beings act generally.
Human beings, it turns out, are neither demi-gods nor potted plants. We are
powerful but not autonomous; we are constrained but not insignificant.3
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama.
1. During the Iran-Contra Hearings, Oliver North's lawyer, Brendan Sullivan, famously
defended his right to intervene when his client was being questioned by Senator Daniel Inouye. See
Iran-Contra Hearings; Note of Braggadocio Resounds at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1987, at
A7. In response to Senator Inouye's suggestion that North "object if he wishes to," Sullivan replied
"Well, sir, I'm not a potted plant.... I'm here as the lawyer. That's my job." Id.
2. Compare H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135 (2d ed. 1994) ("Here at the margin of
rules and in the fields left open by the theory of precedents, the courts perform a rule-producing
function."), with RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-45 (1978) (criticizing the idea
that law "runs out" in cases where no clear guidance is given by precedent), and HART, supra, at
259-63 (reply to Dworkin).
3. For a Christian theological account of what is means to be human, see G.C. BERKOUWER,
In this paper, I will examine what Christian theology has to teach us
about the nature of human creative activity and ask whether there might be
anything to be learned about "making" human law on the basis of that
investigation. I am not contending that "making" is the best metaphor for
what human judges do when they decide on matters germane to our legal
and political life. 4 Nevertheless, we often speak in terms of judges making
law, so the question seems worth asking.5
Rather than attempt to survey and synthesize multiple theological
accounts of human making, I have chosen to focus on just one-Dorothy
Sayers's The Mind of the Maker6 -and this, in part, because Sayers's well-
known account is highly suggestive as to the role some form of "higher law"
might play in the human activity of judging. As explained in Part II below,
Sayers argues that human creative activity has a Trinitarian structure, which
she identifies as Idea, Energy, and Power.7 These three elements correspond
roughly to: (i) the whole Idea of the work in the mind of the artist, with
reference to which the creative activity is carried out (Father); (ii) the
creative Activity that makes the work incarnate (Son); and (iii) the work's
Power to influence the human person and the community's public context(Spirit). 8 The foundational analogy that drives Sayers's account of human
creativity is the relation between God's creative activity and that of human
beings made in his image. 9
Parts III, IV, and V elaborate, in turn, each of the three elements
described above. Part III connects Sayers's account of the creative Idea-
the as-yet unrealized concept of the whole that regulates human creative
MAN: THE IMAGE OF GOD (Dirk W. Jellema trans., 1962); see also William S. Brewbaker III,
Theory, Identity, Vocation: Three Models of Christian Legal Scholarship, 38 SETON HALL L. REV.(forthcoming 2009) (discussing human capacity for knowledge).
4. In fact, I am inclined to agree with Oliver O'Donovan that, on the whole, "judgment"
captures legal decision making better than "making" or "creating." See Oliver O'DONOVAN, THE
WAYS OF JUDGMENT 8-9 (2005). Nevertheless, as O'Donovan observes, legal judgments may
involve substantial changes to the public order and thus may rightly be called creative. Id. And,
even though judgments are "unlike a work of art" in that they "create[] the new only by pronouncing
upon the old," neither artistic nor legal creativity "can be radically creative in the sense of giving
existence to things that had no existence before." Id. at 9.
5. One might also compare legislative or judicial action to human acts of "making" outside the
fine arts-to crafts as well as arts. The action of the legislator or judge may resemble not only the
fiction writer or the poet, but also the carpenter or the architect. Indeed, Thomas Aquinas apparently
favors the latter example. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-I, q. 95, art. 2(Benzinger Bros. eds., Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947); see generally
William S. Brewbaker I1, Thomas Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Law, 58 ALA. L. REV. 575, 598-
99 (2007) [hereinafter Brewbaker, Metaphysics of Law] (discussing architectural metaphor in
connection with legal variation).
6. DOROTHY SAYERS, THE MIND OF THE MAKER (1956).
7. Id. at 47.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 46-47.
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energy-with classical legal theory's account of "The Law"--a transcendent
body of overarching legal principles.'0 There is an obvious similarity
between the artist's dependence on the Idea in Sayers's account and the
judge's dependence on The Law in classical legal theory. Significantly,
however, Sayers does not claim transcendental status for the Ideas that
govern human artists' creative work; the Idea is the product of the mind of
the individual human maker." Sayers's account thus suggests that if
something like The Law exists as a regulative construct, it need not
necessarily be tightly connected with natural law. The Law might be
"higher" without being "natural."
Part IV focuses on Sayers's concept of the Energy, or Activity, and
accordingly draws attention to the medium of law and the craft of legal
decision making.12 Sayers argues that failure to attend to the contours and
limitations of artistic media can result in artistic failure. '3  Similar
consequences befall attempts to make law that do not respect the form of law
and its limitations and that do not take seriously the demands of the legal
craft.
Part V concludes by giving attention to Sayers's concept of a work's
Power-the fact of its encounter with human beings in a public context.14
This insight helps explain how laws can fail when they run afoul of higher
facts-when they are unworkable with respect to the conditions they seek to
regulate, sit uneasily with other existing laws, or are opposed by public
opinion. Reception of the legal work is also critical as to whether the law
will be obeyed and, if so, whether that obedience will be experienced as free
or coerced.
II. SAYERS'S METHODOLOGY IN THE MIND OF THE MAKER
The Mind of the Maker begins with two fundamental theological facts:
(1) God is Creator of heaven and earth, and (2) human beings are created in
his image.' 5 Sayers follows St. Thomas Aquinas in stressing that such
language is, and must be, analogical, yet argues that there is no alternative:
"To complain that man measures God by his own experience is a waste of
time; man measures everything by his own experience; he has no other
10. See infra notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
11. See SAYERS, supra note 6, at 51.
12. See infra notes 53-87 and accompanying text.
13. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 71.
14. See infra notes 88-112.
15. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 33.
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yardstick."' 16 Language helps us draw connections between experiences. 17
Sayers's project is to examine "[t]he analogical statements of experience"
that are "used by the Christian creeds about God the Creator,"' 18 to draw
upon those statements to illuminate our account of human creativity, and,
perhaps more surprisingly, to draw upon our experience with human
creativity to illuminate the creeds.
Creator is not the only analogical term Sayers employs. Because God is
triune and human beings bear God's image, Sayers presupposes that all
human activity has a Trinitarian structure.' 9 She presents the Trinitarian
structure of human creative activity as follows:
First .... there is the Creative Idea, passionless, timeless,
beholding the whole work complete at once, the end in the
beginning: and this is the image of the Father.
Second, there is the Creative Energy [or Activity] begotten of
that idea, working in time from the beginning to the end, with sweat
and passion, being incarnate in the bonds of matter: and this is the
image of the Word.
Third, there is the Creative Power, the meaning of the work and
its response in the lively soul: and this is the image of the
indwelling Spirit.
And these three are one, each equally in itself the whole work,
whereof none can exist without other: and this is the image of the
Trinity.20
Having identified the structure of creative work, Sayers elaborates on it
using her experience as a fiction writer.2 ' She argues that artistic works are
in some sense whole ideas existing in the mind of the human maker, much as
16. Id. at 36.
17. Id. at 37.
18. Id. at 38.
19. Sayers begins by quoting Augustine's account of sight, which Augustine is using to explain
the Trinity by analogy to familiar things. Id. at 46. Sayers implicitly reverses the analogy: It is not
merely happenstance that sight is a threefold matter; rather sight is threefold because God is. Id.
Augustine says that in the activity of sight, three elements are inseparably present: "the form seen,
the act of vision, and the mental attention which correlates the two. These three, though separable in
theory, are inseparably present whenever you use your sight. Again, every thought is an inseparable
trinity of memory, understanding and will." Id. at 46 (quoting ST. AUGUSTINE, ON THE TRINITY bk.
1, ch. I (Gareth B. Matthews ed., Stephen McKenna trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002)).
20. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). Sayers notes that the argument of the book is an expansion of the
concluding speech of St. Michael in her play The Zeal of Thy House, from which the quotation is
taken. Id.
21. Id. at 54 ("In the metaphors used by the Christian creeds about the mind of the maker, the
creative artist can recognize a true relation to his own experience.").
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God's unfolding plan for the universe exists in the divine mind.22 In the
Activity23 of making the work incarnate (realizing it), the Activity "is
conscious of referring all its acts to an existing and complete whole. 24 To
illustrate, according to Sayers, a writer judges a word or a phrase or an
action undertaken by a character in a novel by reference to "a pattern of the
entire book," with which the word or phrase or action either does or does not
comport. 2' Finally, the Power of the work is seen when it has contact with
other minds (or even with the mind of its maker); the work has the ability to
produce a response in the reader.26 The overall success of a creative work
depends on the strength (absolute and relative) of the Idea, the Activity, and
the Power. Deficiencies in any element, or the failure to keep the three
elements in proportion to each other are, for Sayers, important sources of
artistic failure.27
22. Id. at 48. It should be noted that the relationship is one of analogy rather than complete
identity. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
23. Sayers apparently prefers to describe the second aspect of the creation as Activity rather than
Energy but had used "Energy" in her initial presentation of these ideas. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 47.
She describes the Activity as follows:
It is dynamic-the sum and process of all the activity which brings the book into
temporal and spatial existence. "All things are made by it, and without it nothing is made
that has been made." To it belongs everything that can be included under the word
"passion"-feeling, thought, toil, trouble, difficulty, choice, triumph-all the accidents
which attend a manifestation in time. It is the Energy that is the creator in the sense in
which the common man understands the word, because it brings about an expression in
temporal form of the eternal and immutable Idea. It is, for the writer, what he means by
"the writing of the book," and it includes, though it is not confined to, the manifestation
of the book in material form.... [I]t is something distinct from the Idea itself, though it is
the only thing that can make the Idea known to itself or to others, and yet
is... essentially identical with the Idea--"consubstantial with the Father."
Id. at 49-50.
24. Id. at 48 ("In theological terms, the Son does the will of the Father.").
25. Id. Mysteriously, she adds that:
The Idea of the book is a thing-in-itself quite apart from its awareness or its manifestation
in Energy, though it still remains true that it cannot be known as a thing-in-itself except
as the Energy reveals it. The Idea is thus timeless and without parts or passions, though it
is never seen, either by writer or reader, except in terms of time, parts and passion.
Id. at 49.
26. Id. at 50.
27. See id. ("If you were to ask a writer which is 'the real book'-his Idea of it, his Activity in
writing it, or its return to himself in Power, he would be at a loss to tell you, because these things are
essentially inseparable.").
III. THE ARTIST, THE IDEA, THE JUDGE, AND "THE LAW"
The most obvious point of contact between Sayers's Trinitarian account
of human creativity and the Anglo-American legal tradition is the normative
connection Sayers draws between creative activity and an inchoate Idea to
which the activity is referred.28 As Steven Smith has reminded us, much of
our legal practice seems to presuppose something like the "transcendental
body of law ' 29 common lawyers used to call The Law. We distinguish
between the law and "precedent," speak of judges "getting the law wrong,"
countenance retroactive decision making, and otherwise act as if something
like The Law existed over and above discrete judicial decisions.30 In the
classical view of the common law, the judge's goal was to declare The Law
as it applied to the facts of the particular case.31 Or, translating this idea into
Sayerian terminology, the judge "refer[s] all [his] acts to ... [a] complete
whole. 32
Let us assume for present purposes that Sayers's account of the
Trinitarian structure of human making is correct, and consider how it might
be extended to judicial making of law. As we have seen, Sayers draws the
following analogy: (A) God's creative Activity is to (B) God's Idea for the
creation of the world33 as (a) a human author's creative Activity is to (b) the
author's Idea for the book.34 Can we extend this same analogy to (a)
judicial decision making (Activity) and (3) The Law (Idea)?35
We should start by remembering that when Sayers compares divine
making to human making, she is speaking analogically, not univocally, and
that her understanding of analogy is heavily indebted to Thomas Aquinas.36
Human beings may have been created in God's image, but we are not gods;
thus, human making bears a resemblance to divine making in at least some
respects, but one sort of making is also unlike the other.37 The meanings of
28. See supra note 25.
29. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 46, 51-52 (2004).
30. Id. at 51-62.
31. Id. at 61 (recognizing that the classical assumption of the law includes the "convention that
'judges only declare and do not make the law"') (internal citation omitted).
32. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 48.
33. St. Thomas refers to this element as the "Eternal Law." See AQUINAS, supra note 5, at pt. I-
II, q. 93, art. 1.
34. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 47.
35. The complete analogy is thus (A) God's creative activity : (B) God's Idea for the creation of
the world :: (a) a human author's creative activity : (b) the author's Idea for the book :: (a) judicial
decision making : (0) The Law.
36. Sayers begins Chapter two, which contains her most significant discussion of analogy, with a
quotation from Aquinas, and her treatment of the topic is basically Thomistic. Cf AQUINAS, supra
note 5, at pt. 1, q. 13, art. 5; Brewbaker, Metaphysics of Law, supra note 5, at 607-09 (discussing
analogical predication in Aquinas's thought).
37. One obvious difference is that God creates ex nihilo and humans do not. See SAYERS, supra
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the word making in each instance are not identical, but neither are they
wholly unrelated to each other.
Note also that when the analogy is extended from human making of a
work of art to human making of law in the judicial process, we have added
an additional analogical dimension. Divine "making" differs from human
"making" in what we might call a vertical analogy, but there is also a
horizontal analogical relationship between human "making" of a work of
fiction and human "making" of law in a judicial decision. The two activities
are similar in some respects, but different in others.38
One of the criticisms of analogical reasoning of the type Sayers employs
is its indeterminacy.39 If human and divine making are alike in some
respects and different in others, how do we know which characteristics of
making are shared and which are not? Moreover, given the horizontal
dimension of analogical relationships, is it not possible that one sort of
human making might resemble divine making in a particular respect that
another sort of human making does not?
We can immediately see this difficulty when we start to unpack the
relevance of Sayers's account of human creativity for law. One of the
important differences between divine creation and the human fiction writer's
creation, according to Sayers, is that the Idea for the fiction writer's novel
comes from the writer, not from God.4 ° Is the same true of the human
judge's "making" of law? If so, the implication would be that the Idea
guiding judicial activity would be an idea better characterized as human than
divine. Or, in the alternative, is it possible that, in the special case of law
"making," the human Activity is regulated by a divine Idea of The Law to
which, through some mechanism (perhaps reason) human beings have
access?
note 6, at 38.
38. At one point Sayers states that "we conceive of the act of absolute creation [creation ex
nihilo] as being an act analogous to that of the creative artist." Id. at 40. While one may concede
that creativity is occasionally useful in judging, it obviously plays a far less important role than it
does for the artist. The contrast suggests a significant disanalogy. Aquinas compares the ruler to an
architect. See supra note 5.
39. For a helpful discussion of the uses and limitations of analogy, see 3 ALISTER McGRATH, A
SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY: THEORY 104-32 (2003).
40. See SAYERS, supra note 6, at 47-48 ("[Idea] is here used, not in the philosopher's sense, in
which the "Idea" tends to be equated with the 'Word,' but quite simply in the sense intended by the
writer when he says: 'I have an idea for a book."'). The Word to which Sayers refers is apparently
what Aquinas calls the eternal Law, the plan by which God made the universe. See AQUINAS, supra
note 5, at pt. I-II, q. 93, art. 1.
Classical natural law theory is sometimes mistakenly thought to affirm
something very much like the latter alternative. Put in Sayers's terms, in this
caricature (we might call it "vulgar" natural law), a singular cross-cultural
Idea guiding human legal activity is specified by God once and for all times
and is available more or less in detail to anyone capable of exercising right
reason, leaving only the relatively passive judicial Activity of discerning and
declaring it-in oracular fashion-in each instance. 41
It turns out, however, that the classical conception of natural law is
much more complex than this caricature. Interestingly, in Aquinas's seminal
account, natural law turns out to be law that is neither the divinely-given
eternal law, nor merely human law. Instead, it occupies something of a
middle ground; Aquinas describes natural law as the "imprint on us of the
Divine light," the "rational creature's participation of the eternal law. 42
Part of God's plan for the universe (the "eternal law" in Aquinas's
terminology) is to equip human beings with the capacity to know truth,
including moral truth. Human knowledge falls well short of divine
knowledge,43 but reason is a gift from God, and human knowledge can be
true knowledge nonetheless.
The unfolding picture of human lawmaking in the classical natural law
tradition is that while God knows justice in all its fullness, it is only the main
ideas of justice-the "first principles of natural law"-that are naturally
known (more or less) to all human beings and are (more or less) the same for
all.44 This authoritative knowledge of right and wrong does not come in
41. A few texts lend at least surface support to this vision of natural law. See, e.g., CICERO, On
the Commonwealth, Book 3, in ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS 63-73 (James E.G.
Zetzel ed., 2002), reprinted in Stephen E. Gottleib et al., JURISPRUDENCE CASES AND MATERIALS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND ITS APPLICATIONS 73 (2d ed. 2006):
True law is right reason, consonant with nature, spread through all people. It is constant
and eternal .. . . It is wrong to pass laws obviating this law; it is not permitted to
abrogate any of it; it cannot be totally repealed. We cannot be released from this law by
the senate or the people, and it needs no exegete or interpreter .... There will not be one
law at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another later; but all nations at all times
will be bound by this one eternal and unchangeable law, and the god will be the one
common master and general (so to speak) of all people: He is the author, expounder, and
mover of this law; and the person who does not obey it will be in exile for himself.
Insofar as he scorns his nature as a human being, by this very fact he will pay the greatest
penalty, even if he escapes all the other things that are generally recognized as
punishments.
Id. at 73. Justice Story famously quotes portions of this passage in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 12(1842), overruled by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in arguing that "[t]he law
respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared ... to be in a great measure, not the law of
a single country only, but of the commercial world." Id. (emphasis added). The emphasis I have
supplied to Justice Story's quotation should suffice to call into question whether Swift v. Tyson is
intended to constitute an endorsement of "vulgar" natural law.
42. AQUINAS, supra note 5, at pt. 1-1l, q. 91, art. 2.
43. Id. at pt. l-ll, q. 91, art. 3.
44. See id. at pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 4.
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sufficient detail to provide all the specifications needed for a real-world legal
system. Judges and legislators must therefore make "particular
determinations" 45 -filling in the necessary subordinate specifications.
Aquinas acknowledges that these details can be culturally specific and, much
of the time, matters of moral indifference. 46 Judges are to use their God-
given faculty of human reason (including its moral orientation) to make the
determinations, but the determinations do not carry the full weight of the
main principles of natural law.4 7 Most of the questions with which the legal
system occupies itself are not directly answered by natural law, but rather
fall into the determinations category.48
Returning to Sayers's analogy, and more particularly to the question of
the possible relationship between The Law and judicial Activity, there seems
to be a disconnect between the concept of The Law as used in the Anglo-
American tradition and natural law as traditionally understood.49 The Law
has generally been (i) conceived of in propositional terms and (ii) thought to
cover decisions that Aquinas puts in the category of "determinations"-
questions not directly answered by the natural law. In Aquinas's scheme,
the principles of natural law are not specific enough to produce most
"determinations."50 "Determinations" are connected to the natural law not
so much by their specific content as by the requirement that the decision
maker employ the divine gift of reason in deciding upon them.5 1 The Law,
if it exists, has been thought to be more specific than natural law.
5 2
45. See id. at pt. I-II, q. 91, art. 3; id. at pt. I-Il, q. 95, art. 2.
46. See id. at pt. 1-Il, q. 95, art. 2; id. at pt. I-1, q. 95, art. 4.
47. See id. at pt. I-II, q. 95, art. 2 (arguing that while laws derived directly from the first
principles of natural law "have some force from the natural law," determinations "have no other
force than that of human law").
48. See id. at pt. I-Il, q. 91, art. 3 ("[I]t is from the precepts of the natural law.., that the human
reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular
determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential
conditions of law be observed .... "); id. (attributing the need for "determinations" to the limits of
natural human participation in the divine wisdom).
49. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 36-40.
50. See AQUINAS, supra note 5, at pt. I-II, q. 95, art. 2.
51. Id.
52. A possible point of connection between traditional natural law and The Law is Aquinas's
idea of natural law by addition. Aquinas says at one point that "nothing hinders the natural law
from being changed [in its secondary principles]: since many things for the benefit of human life
have been added over and above the natural law, both by the Divine law and by human laws." Id. at
pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 5. But cf id. at pt. I-l1, q. 95, art. 2 (determinations "have no other force than that
of human law").
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If we are to take the idea of The Law seriously, then, we may not
want to associate it as much with natural law as with the institutional
practices that have worked together in the Anglo-American legal tradition to
minimize disagreements about legal particulars and stabilize legal
interpretation in areas of decision making that are not specified by general
principles of morality. These practices include the doctrine of precedent,
appellate review, legislative supremacy, a bench and bar drawn largely from
elite and homogeneous cultural elements, common legal education, and no
doubt many others. This raises the possibility that, if Sayers's analogy
holds, The Law to which judges recur in making decisions could be far more
specific than the universal principles of natural law. Instead, The Law might
be part universal morality, part cultural tradition, and part stability-
generating legal custom.
To summarize, Sayers's model suggests that if law making is like other
sorts of creating, we ought not be surprised to find that something like The
Law norms juridical activity, just as Ideas help shape other examples of
human making. That said, we need not presuppose a strong connection
between The Law and divine law or natural law in the classical sense. The
common law, understood as the custom(s) of a particular legal tradition, is a
more likely candidate. In the Anglo-American inheritance, we might say
that The Law could be "higher" than the precedents that embody it (or
evidence it) without meriting the status of natural or divine law. Indeed, it
would be dangerous and possibly idolatrous to assume that The Law
represents a higher moral authority.
IV. THE MAKER AND THE MEDIUM
Sayers next proceeds to explore the Energy (or Activity), which can be
understood as the process of realizing the work-of incarnating it-bringing
it from mere conception to created reality.53 In this discussion, Sayers calls
attention to both human freedom and its limits.
54
Sayers's account is at odds with two popular conceptions of human
agency. The first has been identified by Charles Taylor as disengagement.
55
The key aspect of this condition is "the assumption of an instrumental stance
towards [the world and the body]. 56  When we assume a posture of
disengagement, "we use the other as an instrument, as the mere means for
realizing our will, and not as in some way integral to our being .... [W]e do
53. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 49.
54. Id. at 69.
55. COLIN GUNTON, THE ONE, THE THREE AND THE MANY: GOD, CREATION AND THE CULTURE
OF MODERNITY, THE BAMPTON LECTURES 1992, at 13-14 (1993) (quoting CHARLES TAYLOR,
SOURCES OF THE SELF 155 (1989)).
56. Id. at 13.
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not seek in the world for what is true and good and beautiful, but create our
truth and values for ourselves." 57 The disengaged person is ill at home in
the world, because the world has little importance in its own right, appearing
merely as a blank canvas on which he can impose his will.i 8
If disengagement involves a pathological disrespect for the world (one's
"environment"), the proposed cure has often been an idolatrous "respect"
that is suspicious of human agency.5 9 Sayers follows Christian theology in
rejecting both extremes. Christian theology has described the human
relationship to the rest of the world as dominion: "a worshipping and
respectful sovereignty, a glad responsibility for the natural order which [the
human person] both discem[s] and love[s]. ' '60  Humans are to discern the
created order-to recognize that order and the limitations it places on human
and other life and to love it-to engage with it in respectful gratitude as the
handiwork of a good God, but nevertheless to rule over it.
Discernment and love are both present in Sayers's account of the artist's
relation to the world. Failure to respect the hard facts of the world's given
order, she says, always end in catastrophe: When human actions
come into collision with the nature of things, and in particular with
the fundamental realities of human nature, they will end by
producing an impossible situation which.., will issue in such
catastrophes as war, pestilence and famine. Catastrophes thus
caused are the execution of universal law upon arbitrary enactments
which contravene the facts; they are thus properly called by
theologians, judgments of God.61
It should therefore come as no surprise that artistic freedom for Sayers
consists in the artist's willing submission "to the limitations of
[the] ... medium. The attempt to achieve freedom from the medium ends
inevitably in loss of freedom within the medium, since here as everywhere,
57. Id. at 14.
58. See OLIVER O'DONOVAN, RESURRECTION AND MORAL ORDER: AN OUTLINE FOR
EVANGELICAL ETHICS 52 (2d ed. 1994) ("[I]f it were true that [humanity] imposed [its] rule upon
nature from without, then there would be no limit to it. It would have been from the beginning a
crude struggle to stamp an inert and formless nature with the insignia of his will.").
59. See GUNTON, supra note 55, at 174 ("It is one of the many contradictions of modernity that
side by side have developed a view of the person as essentially indistinguishable from, identical in
being with, the non-personal universe, and a view of the person as so discontinuous with the matter
of the world as to be an alien within it.").
60. O'DONOVAN, supra note 4, at 52.
61. SAERS, supra note 6, at 23 (Note that the resulting picture of God is rather impersonal.).
activity falls under the judgment of the law of its own nature. 62 Sayers
illustrates this idea with two different sorts of artistic failures-those that
stem from attempting to transcend the medium and those that result from
indifference to it.
63
The exemplar of the former failure in Sayers's book is the "literary"
drama-which someone has described as "the dramatic hybrid which
confuses the library with the stage ... [or] whose composition suggests the
man of letters who regards the theatre as a medium beneath his lofty
dignity." 64 Sayers describes the problem with the "literary drama" as a
confusion of media. The drama, she says, has been written
to conform to an alien literary medium. ... This means that the
writer's Energy [Activity] has arrogated to itself a freedom from
natural law-it has refused to be bound by the trammels imposed by
flesh and blood. The immediate consequence of this freedom is an
intolerable sense of restriction, and the verdict of the critic will be
that "the language is labored." The truth is that such speech is not
"labored" enough-in the sense that it has not been given enough
workmanship.... The business of the creator is not to escape from
his material medium or to bully it, but to serve it; but to serve it he
must love it.
65
In attempting to rise above the medium, the artist has not created
something better, but something worse.
Sayers illustrates the second failure-indifference to the medium-by
imagining a playwright working on the scene in a Nativity play in which the
angel is about to appear to the shepherds.66 The writer no doubt has a
glorious vision of the angel's appearing,67 but, says Sayers:
If he is not to suffer bitter disappointment he must see, while
writing, and at the same time as the vision, the following mundane
and material objects:
A wooden stage ....
A painted sky-cloth ....
A flock of hired or property sheep ....
Three actors or thereabouts, with appropriate wigs and
62. Id. at 71.
63. Id.
64. GEORGE JEAN NATHAN, THE THEATRE OF THE MOMENT: A JOURNALISTIC COMMENTARY 3
(1970).
65. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 71-72.
66. Id. at 155-56.
67. Id.
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costumes ....
Another actor, of ordinary human stature, and weighing some 168
pounds of solid animal matter, draped in furniture satin, and
supporting on his shoulders wings made of wood and paper... or
gauze....
A rope to lower this unfortunate mummer ... 68
Dramatic success cannot be realized apart from attention to the concrete
details of dramatic production. Moreover, success is not merely a matter of
not ignoring the flesh-and-blood limitations of the dramatic medium, but of
affirmatively embracing them.69  The alternative is "a kind of artistic
Gnosticism," the artistic equivalent of the heresy that it "is beneath the
dignity of the son to dwell in a limited material body."7 °
The most obvious legal equivalent of the literary drama is the
philosophical judicial opinion-a decision whose author feels the need to
justify her conclusion with recourse to high theory, perhaps because her
decision sits less easily with ordinary legal sources. 71 A famous example of
such an opinion is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 72 Apparently not content
to let the opinion rest entirely on the more mundane ground of stare decisis,
Justice Kennedy has recourse to a purported right "to define one's own
concept of ... the mystery of human life.",73 While perhaps comprehensible
as a statement of radical philosophical subjectivism, the "right" announced
68. Id. at 156.
69. See id. at 154-55 for a fuller discussion of this embrace and its frustrations.
70. Id. at 158.
71. See generally Michael McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1269
(1997).
72. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
73. Id. at 851 ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."). An equally
problematic passage appears later in the plurality's opinion, which consumes nearly sixty pages of
the United States Reports:
Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time.
So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to
the rule of law. Their belief in themselves . . .is not readily separable from their
understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases
and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court's legitimacy
should be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself
through its constitutional ideals. The Court's concern with legitimacy is not for the sake
of the Court, but for the sake of the Nation to which it is responsible.
Id. at 868.
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in Casey is at worst philosophically incoherent, and at best, completely
extraneous as a statement about law.
One can also find "theological" legal opinions beset by the same general
problem. As with its "philosophical" counterpart, the theological opinion
buttresses its legal conclusions with authorities and arguments that arejarring because they seem to be legally extraneous-as if the legal principle
at stake would become more sound for having been defended at length by
recourse to "higher" extra-constitutional or extra-legal sources such as the
Bible or the writings of the nation's founders.74
The second mistake-indifference or inattention to the legal craft-is a
besetting sin of some modem legal commentators, courts, and legislatures as
well. It is the manifestation in law of the disengagement-the instrumental
stance toward the world-noted earlier.75 On this view, law is only about
"problem-solving," policy, and results. This goal-oriented approach tends to
crowd out reflection on the legal craft, reflection about things that must be
done if law is to function effectively in a real-world society, and other
features of law that real-world judges and legislators ignore at their peril.76
Saint Thomas Aquinas includes reasonableness, government authorship,
orientation to the common good, and promulgation as such criteria, among
others.7 7 Isidore of Seville adds conformity to local custom, the possibility
of conformity to the law, suitability to local conditions, and clarity, among
other features.7 ' Lon Fuller likewise insists on rules, promulgation, clarity,
and possibility of conformity, but adds to the list prospectivity, coherence,
stability, and congruence between the rules as announced and as applied. 79
The contemporary instrumental approach to law easily leads to a loss of
these fundamental aspects of legal craft when they come into conflict with
policy objectives. Concern over "fraud and abuse" in the Medicare program,
for example, has led Congress to enact laws with which it is virtually
impossible for U.S. healthcare providers to comply. 80  They must rely,
instead, on the prosecutorial discretion of U.S. attorneys or request an
74. See, e.g., Ex parte Snider, 929 So. 2d 447, 463-66 (Ala. 2005) (Parker, J., dissenting)(arguing that the court majority should have considered the merits of the plaintiff's religious liberty
claim, which was not raised below, and reproducing lengthy quotations from Thomas Jefferson,
Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, James Madison, and the Bible to support the principle that
"[t]he right to worship God is an inalienable, God-given right recognized by the Founders of the
United States").
75. See GUNTON, supra note 55, at 13.
76. Cf. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 169-98 (criticizing modemity's instrumental orientation).
77. AQUINAS, supra note 5, at pt. I-Il, q. 90.
78. Id. at pt. I-II, q. 95, art. 3.
79. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969).
80. See generally James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205 (1996).
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advisory opinion to know whether proposed conduct is or is not illegal. 81 A
desire to achieve "law and order" has likewise pushed American criminal
law in an increasingly harsh and expansive direction in the last fifty years,
with a corresponding erosion of rule of law values. 82 "Disengaged" lawyers
and judges may also tend to be too slow to concede that perfection in law is
beyond the reach of mere mortals. Or they may find visible particularity and
vestiges of tradition offensive, even when the traditions have been modified
to take account of practical concerns as times have changed. Thus, for
example, one might compare the Restatement (3d) Property (Servitudes),
which is anything but a "Restatement," to 1960s-style urban renewal that
razes old buildings and even neighborhoods to permit the construction of a
gleaming concrete-and-steel structure (without windows that open).
8 3
Rationality is achieved--combining formerly fragmented interests,
eliminating arcane and "vestigial" requirements, and so forth. The cost,
however, is sometimes law that is more or less inorganic to its setting and,
for the foreseeable future, unpredictable. 84
A related point is the loss of a sense of proportion among legal scholars
as to what sort of work merits their attention. "Practitioner-oriented" legal
scholarship has come to be a recipe for professional failure in the
contemporary legal academy. The scholars receiving the greatest amount of
attention from their peers now write about law from the perspective of
81. See id. at 219-25 (illustrating this process in an analysis of safe-harbor regulation passed in
the late 1980s).
82. See David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 819-31 (2006).
83. See A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern is Dead, Long Live the Doctrine, 77 NEB. L. REV.
804, 810 (1998) ("The primary objective of the new Restatement is to eliminate much of the baroque
facade of the law of 'servitudes' and replace it with modem, functional doctrines which both unify
and simplify the law.").
84. On the other hand, deference to tradition can clearly be taken too far. See, e.g., I WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 70 ("And hence it is that our lawyers are
with justice so copious in their encomiums on the reason of the common law; that they tell us, that
the law is the perfection of reason, that it always intends to conform thereto, and that what is not
reason is not law. Not that the particular reason of every rule in the law can at this distance of time
be always precisely assigned; but it is sufficient that there be nothing in the rule flatly contradictory
to reason, and then the law will presume it to be well founded. And it hath been an antient [sic)
observation in the laws of England, that whenever a standing rule of law, of which the reason
perhaps could not be remembered or discerned, hath been wantonly broke in upon by statutes or new
resolutions, the wisdom of the rule hath in the end appeared from the inconveniences that have
followed the innovation.") (internal footnote omitted). Colin Gunton argues for a stance toward
tradition involving a dynamic of gift and reception: "[l]n order to make grateful use of the work of
my teachers I must also come to decisions about what I shall take from them, and what reject."
GUNTON, supra note 55, at 95.
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economic and/or quantitative analysis. 85  Other widely noticed topics are
constitutional theory and political philosophy. While there is nothing
objectionable about investigating law from any of these perspectives, the
value placed on large-scale societal impact is worth noting (and should not
be surprising if law is understood to be merely a mechanism for social
control).
Legal scholarship may also be valued because it offers a transcendent
outside (usually "prophetic") 86 perspective on law, even if it does not affect
policy. Assisting ordinary lawyers and judges in doing their work is a far
less glamorous and inviting occupation.17 In each case, there may well be a
connection between the values of the legal academy and the Gnostic attitude
that the mundane, flesh-and-blood realities of ordinary human callings are
not worthy of our attention. These attitudes are entirely appropriate for a
disengaged demigod, but not, according to Christian doctrine, for a human
person.
V. LAW'S RECEPTION
Power, the final element in Sayers's Trinitarian construction of the
creative process, calls attention to the fact that a work's creation is not the
end of the story.88 Once a work is finished, it has its own independent
existence. It will elicit a response from others, including both the artist and
the audience. Implicit in Sayers's formulation, and explicit in the Christian
theology on which her proposal is based, is the created work's separateness
from its creator and its unique place in the unfolding story of the world.89
Once created, a work will exist in relation to the other realities in the
world. One implication of this for new law is that a decision, statute, or
regulation will be tested by the way it operates (or fails to operate) in the
85. This statement is based on a casual survey of the top ten paper downloads on the Social
Sciences Research Network (SSRN) as of February 16, 2008. See Social Sciences Research
Network Home Page, http://www.ssm.com/. This measure might well overstate the influence of
economic and quantitative analysis because the database is accessible to academics in other
disciplines such as economics and business.
86. Cf O'DONOVAN, supra note 4, at xv ("It was an evil day for Christian thought when
prophecy became the fashionable category for political reflection in place of practical
reasonableness.").
87. Ironically, many scholars who focus on influencing policy or waxing prophetic about the
contemporary legal system may find that, instead of helping a small but identifiable group of lawyers
who work in an area of law better understand their craft, they influence no one. While a handful of
scholars in each of the main branches of the law undoubtedly do influence the shape of the law, most
law review articles appear not to be read by anybody except law review editors; much less cited byjudges, courts, or even other academics.
88. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 50.
89. On the Creator-creature distinction and its relevance for law generally, see William S.
Brewbaker III, Found Law, Made Law and Creation: Reconsidering Blackstone's Declaratory
Theory, 22 J.L. & RELIG. 255, 278-80 (2006-2007).
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world in which it applies. As noted earlier, Sayers calls a created work's
unsuccessful confrontation with reality a judgment of God,90 and, although
her book is not mainly about law, she specifically addresses human laws:
When the laws regulating human society are so formed as to come
into collision with the nature of things, and in particular with the
fundamental realities of human nature, they will end by producing
an impossible situation which, unless the laws are altered, will issue
in such catastrophes as war, pestilence and famine. Catastrophes
thus caused are the execution of universal law upon arbitrary
enactments which contravene the facts; they are thus properly called
by theologians, judgments of God.91
Such divine judgments are, for Sayers, impersonal occurrences, simple
examples of one law confronting another, and the weaker law yielding, as it
must, to the stronger.
92
Perhaps there are examples of bad laws or decisions yielding
catastrophes like war, pestilence, and famine-we might think here of Roe v.
Wade,93 or Dred Scott,94 or the Jim Crow laws, but failures of ordinary law
are usually more humble than that. Sometimes the failures are felt by the
public; 95 other times they are felt mainly by the lawyers and judges who
must deal with the mess the bad law leaves behind. 96 In such a case, the law
may eventually become moribund, or it may continue to be enforced and
work its misery on those affected. 97
90. See supra note 38.
91. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 23. Sayers's definition appears to extend not only to civil law, but
also to informal rules regulating conduct or sports, for example.
92. Id. at 24-25.
93. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
94. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
95. See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2000) (arguing that
criminalizing immoral conduct can undermine social norms disfavoring such conduct).
96. Consider Justice Scalia's comments about the famously unworkable Lemon test:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of
Center Moriches Union Free School District.... Over the years ... no fewer than five of
the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils
through the creature's heart ....
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. At other times, the reality the law bumps into is contrary opinion, either that of the public at
large or of the elites charged with enforcing the law. In the former case, one might think of the
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Not only must newly created law confront the other realities in the
world, those other realities must take account of the law. The most obvious
example of this is that negative consequences-punishment or civil liability,
for example-may occur to those who ignore the law.98 More significantly
for present purposes, however, new laws affect the public landscape. Along
these lines, Sayers notes that there is a sense in which the creative
imagination operates analogously to the divine creation ex nihilo. "The poet
is not obliged," she writes, "to destroy the material of a Hamlet in order to
create a Falstaff, as a carpenter must destroy a tree-form to create a table-
form." 99 So it is with law: While a new law may take an old one out of
operation, it does not destroy it. A legal historian-or, for that matter, a
lawyer-may study laws that have been repealed in order to understand the
context of the "present" law. Indeed, new law may be unintelligible except
as a reaction against the old. And, occasionally an old law may even regain
its force. What would Alabama's abortion law be, for example, in the event
Roe v. Wade were overtumed?
A new work's independence implies not only its interaction in
foreseeable ways, but can also involve the work taking on a "life of its own,"
or even its subversion by actors with intentions remarkably different from
the original maker.100 Justice White undoubtedly did not intend to
contribute to the abortion license when he concurred in Griswold v.
Connecticut,101 and one doubts whether many of the signers of the
Declaration of Independence intended to provide ammunition for the civil
rights movement. Nevertheless, the legal landscape changed remarkably
with these interventions and their logic eventually, though perhaps not
inevitably, worked its way out into public life.
Sayers also observes that creative works accumulate additional power
over time as they pass through the minds of successive individuals,
becoming progressively more important parts of the fabric against which
discourse occurs. She illustrates this in two ways, proffering first the
example of an arms expert who complained about Sayers's choice of
dynamite as an explosive in one of her novels rather than one of the newer,
futility of trying to enforce an ordinance against scalping football tickets in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, or
one prohibiting pot-smoking at a Grateful Dead concert, or of the Prohibition debacle. The latter
category might include FISA court controversy or the Bush administration's generous use of signing
statements to announce its attention to ignore putatively unconstitutional laws.
98. Sayers underscores the negative consequences of ignoring the moral laws in the Old and New
Testaments, the natural laws, and God's commandments as put forth in the Bible. See SAYERS,
supra note 6, at 26-27.
99. Id. at 40.
100. See id. at 105.
101. See 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring) (holding Connecticut statute forbidding
use of contraceptives unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221-23 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting) (finding Texas statute denying abortions constitutional when health is not implicated).
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more powerful products then available.10 2 Her answer to the expert was that
"the newer words, though associated with more material power, had fewer
associations of literary power," lacking dynamite's association with "the
words dynamo, dynamic, dynasty, and so forth, and such literary
associations as Hardy's The Dynasts."'10 3 Her second illustration makes a
slightly different point by adverting to a few lines from her detective novel,
The Nine Tailors. 104 Within these few lines, she identifies "a whole string of
familiar passages" that were "hovering about in my memory" when she
wrote-allusions from the biblical books of Job, Isaiah, and the Psalms, as
well as the works of Milton, Keats, Browning, Tennyson, Eliot, and
Donne.'05
This phenomenon is no doubt familiar to lawyers. Blackstone argued
that law derived much of its force from its status as ancient legal custom. 106
In the Anglo-American tradition, phrases like "due process of law,"' 7
"freedom of speech,"'0 8 "the right ... to keep and bear arms,"' 109 "equal
protection,"" 0 and "representative government""' carry weight that would
not be reproduced by materially equivalent verbal formulations. The same is
true of even more mundane legal phrases: consideration, mens rea,
proximate cause, nuisance, and takings, to name but a few.
In response to Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham famously argued that, while
it might be true that certain legal phrases gain rhetorical power over time,
this is precisely the reason they must be greeted with suspicion. They were,
102. Today, a reference to "plastic" explosives might be suggestive not merely of destructive
power, but of terrorism and espionage.
103. Id. at 117.
104. Id. at 118 ("[I]ncredibly aloof, flinging back the light in a dusky shimmer of bright hair and
gilded outspread wings, soared the ranked angels, cherubim and seraphim, choir over choir, from
corbel and hammer-beam floating, face to face uplifted.").
105. Seeid. at ll7-19.
106. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 11 (noting that "we often mistake for nature what
we find established by long and inveterate custom"); I BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at 55 (marital
property laws and offense of monopolization not grounded in nature).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Ill. See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 32-33
(1861) (noting that "[a] representative constitution is a means of bringing the general standard of
intelligence and honesty existing in the community, and the individual intellect and virtue of its
wisest members, more directly to bear upon the government").
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for Bentham, merely the stuff of mystification-reliable obstacles to needed
reform. 112
VI. CONCLUSION
Sayers's account suggests that Bentham and Blackstone might both have
been right. There may well be in a society a normative institution that we
might well call The Law-the accretion of cultural artifacts that form the
context of public action, reflecting a community's values--or at least those
of its ruling elites or groups-as well as its rules, its legal traditions, and, in
an incomplete way, the general loves and commitments of the community.
While one might presume, on the basis of the Christian revelation, that there
will always be some connection at some points with moral truth, there is no
reason to presume that such a connection exists all the way down, or even
very much of the way down, the chain of legal particularities. Yet it would
seem to be undeniable that a community's traditions-though they
themselves are shifting and changing-exert a remarkable pull in particular
and identifiable directions at any given time.
This picture of The Law is significant in two directions. First, it helps
explain some of the features of our legal practices that are otherwise
puzzling. "13 One can also see the benefits-in terms of legal craft-that one
might realize from conceiving the judge's role as declaring The Law:
stability, predictability, consonance with existing social norms, and so forth.
And one might even assert, along with Lon Fuller, that there is a necessary
connection between goodness and coherence so that the goal of realizing
The Law in a coherent way, while not sufficient to guarantee a good society,
is a plus and not a minus. 114 Second, however, this picture allows us to
appreciate this limited goodness of The Law without equating The Law with
transcendent moral truth.
This leads to a final insight we might take from Sayers's approach to
creativity. If we take seriously the idea that civil laws are human creations,
we should not be surprised to find that those laws reveal something about
their makers, just as God's creation reveals something about him. Consider
Sayers's comments on autobiography:
Like the creation of an imagined character, but in a much higher
degree, [an autobiography] is an infallible self-betrayal. The truth
112. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 4 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1967) (describing the "grand and
fundamental" defect of Blackstone's Commentaries as "the antipathy to reformation").
113. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
114. But see H.L.A. HART, Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY 349-50 (1983) (questioning the value of an inner "morality of poisoning").
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about the writer's personality will out, in spite of itself; any
illusions which he may entertain about himself become fearfully
apparent the moment he begins to handle himself as a created
character, subject to the nature of his own art. As in every other
work of creation, insincerity issues in false art. 1 5
A society's laws reveal the society for what it is, either in its
unconscious and unconfessed evil, which will ultimately be revealed in what
Sayers calls "divine judgment," or in self-covering, where its words do not
match its deeds. 116 Because we know on the authority of both experience
and revelation that the line between good and evil runs through the heart of
each human being and, by extension, each political society, equating The
Law of the Medes or the Persians or the Americans or the English with the
true, the good and the just will often be idolatrous. ' 7 But that may turn out
to be a very different claim than saying that something like The Law-in all
its shifting forms and differing conceptions and debated content-cannot
exist. As Sayers observes: "Nobody but a god can pass unscathed through
the searching ordeal of incamation." ts
115. See SAYERS, supra note 6, at 92.
116. Id. at 93.
117. On these themes, see generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Earthly Peace of the Liberal
Republic, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 73-92 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert
F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001).
118. SAYERS, supra note 6, at 93.
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